Group signature schemes allow users to sign messages on behalf of a group while (1) maintaining anonymity (within that group) with respect to an observer, yet (2) ensuring traceability of a signer (by the group manager) when needed. In this work we give the first construction of a group signature scheme based on lattices (more precisely, the learning with errors assumption), in the random oracle model. Toward our goal, we construct a new algorithm for sampling a random superlattice of a given modular lattice together with a short basis, that may be of independent interest.
Introduction
Group signature schemes [16] allow users to sign messages on behalf of a group administered by some manager. The group is initialized by having the group manager generate master public and secret keys; upon admission to the group, a user is given a personal secret key that is derived from the master secret key by the manager. A member of the group can sign a message using their personal secret key, enabling anyone who knows the master public key to verify that some group member signed the message. Roughly, group signatures are required to satisfy two seemingly contradictory requirements: given some legitimate group signature σ, the group manager should be able to determine which member of the group issued σ (traceability), but no one other than the group manager should be able to determine any information about the signer (anonymity). Group signatures have proven to be a popular primitive, and since their introduction several constructions have been proposed both with random oracles [5, 6, 13, 10, 14, 22] and without [7, 9, 4, 11, 12, 21] .
While there exist constructions of group signature schemes based on trapdoor permutations [7, 9] , such schemes serve only as proofs of feasibility and are far from practical. On the other hand, practical schemes are based on a relatively small set of assumptions: namely, the strong RSA assumption [5, 6, 13, 22] and various assumptions related to groups having an associated bilinear map [10, 14, 4, 11, 12, 21] . In this work we show the first construction of a group signature scheme from assumptions related to lattices. The use of lattice-based assumptions in cryptography has seen a flurry of activity in recent years. In part, this is due to a general desire to expand the set of assumptions on which cryptosystems can be based (i.e., beyond the standard set of assumptions related to the hardness of factoring and solving the discrete logarithm problem). Relying on lattice-based assumptions offers several concrete advantages as well: such assumptions are appealing because of the known worst-case/average-case connections between lattice problems, and also because lattice problems are currently immune to quantum attacks. Even restricting to classical attacks, the best-known algorithms for solving several lattice problems require exponential time (in contrast to the sub-exponential algorithms known, e.g., for factoring). Finally, relying on lattices can potentially yield efficient constructions because the basic lattice operations manipulate relatively small numbers and are inherently parallelizable.
While our resulting construction is less efficient than existing schemes based on number-theoretic assumptions, our construction is significantly more efficient than the generic approaches of [7, 9] that rely on NIZK proofs based on a Karp reduction to some NP-complete language. We remark that although Peikert and Vaikuntanathan [27] construct efficient NIZK proofs for specific lattice problems, their results are not directly applicable to the existing generic constructions.
Our Techniques
Our construction combines ideas from several different works, tying these together using a new technical tool described below. At a high level, our group signature scheme follows a template similar (but not identical) to that of Bellare et al. [7] . The master public key in our scheme includes a public key pk E for a public-key encryption scheme, along with n signature verification keys pk 1 , . . . , pk N . The personal secret key given to the ith group member is sk i , the signing key corresponding to pk i . To sign a message M , the group member (1) signs M using sk i ; (2) encrypts the resulting signature using pk E ; and then (3) provides a NIZK proof of well-formedness (namely, that the given ciphertext encrypts a signature on M relative to one of the pk i ). This implies anonymity (since no one other than the group manager knows the decryption key sk E corresponding to pk E ), yet ensures traceability because the group manager can decrypt the ciphertext that is included as part of any valid group signature.
To instantiate this approach using lattice-based assumptions, we need to identify candidate signature and encryption schemes along with an appropriate NIZK proof system. While constructions of the former primitives based on lattices are known, we do not currently have constructions of NIZK for all of NP from lattice-based assumptions and we therefore have to tailor our scheme so that it can rely on (efficient) NIZK proofs for some specific language. This is explained in more detail in what follows.
For the underlying signature scheme we use the GPV signature scheme [19] that works roughly as follows. The public key is a basis A ∈ Z n×m q for a random lattice. To sign a message M , the signer uses a trapdoor T to find a "short" vector e ∈ Z m with Ae = H(M ) (where H is a hash function modeled as a random oracle). Under suitable assumptions, finding such a short vector e without the trapdoor is hard.
We encrypt the resulting signature using what can be viewed as a non-standard variant of the Regev encryption scheme [28] . Given a matrix B ∈ Z n×m q , viewed as a public key, we encrypt e ∈ Z m by choosing a random vector s ∈ Z n q and outputting the ciphertext z = B T s+e. Effectively, e here is being used as the noise in an instance of the "learning with errors" (LWE) problem [28] . Before going further, we stress that this "encryption scheme" is not semantically secure. However, it turns out that we need something much weaker than semantic security in order to prove anonymity of our scheme; roughly, all we need is that the encryption of a uniformly random e ∈ Z m q is computationally indistinguishable from the encryption of a vector e chosen from a certain discrete Gaussian distribution. We defer further discussion to Section 3.
As described thus far, our group signature scheme would have a master public key consisting of verification keys A 1 , . . . , A N along with an encryption key B; a signature would include z = B T s + e, where e is such that A i e = H(M ) for some i, along with a proof of well-formedness of the ciphertext z. Constructing the proof of well-formedness turns out to be the most difficult aspect of our work, and we must modify our scheme a bit in order to make such a proof (reasonably) efficient. (In doing so, we also rely on specific properties of the GPV signature scheme.) We change our scheme as follows: Now, the master public key contains N verification keys A 1 , . . . , A N (as before) and also N encryption keys B 1 , . . . , B N . To sign a message M , user i computes a real signature e i (using the trapdoor associated with A i ) and "pseudo-signatures" e j for all j = i. Each "pseudo-signature" e j has the property that A j e j = H(M ), however e j is not short (and thus not a valid signature). All the {e j } N j=1 are then encrypted as before, with each e j being encrypted using B j to give a ciphertext z j . We then have the signer provide a proof that (1) each z j encrypts a correct pseudo-signature with respect to A j , and (2) at least one of these pseudo-signatures is short (and hence, in fact, a valid signature). Further details are given next.
To provide a way for the signer to prove that every ciphertext z j encrypts a pseudo-signature, we develop a new technical tool that we believe to be of independent interest: a way to sample a basis for an orthogonal lattice with its associated trapdoor. 1 Specifically, we show a technique that, given a matrix B, generates (A, T) such that AB T = 0 (mod q) and T is still a "good trapdoor" (in the sense required for GPV signatures) for A. If we use matrices {A i } generated in this way as verification keys in the group signature scheme described earlier, then it is possible to verify that a given ciphertext z j encrypts a pseudo-signature with respect to A j by checking whether
The only thing that remains is to provide a proof that at least one of the z j encrypts a vector e j that is also short. This translates to proving that at least one of the vectors z j = B T j s j + e j is "close to" the lattice generated by the columns of B T j . This can be done using the (statistical) zero-knowledge protocol of Micciancio and Vadhan [24] , coupled with standard techniques [17, 18] for making the proof witness indistinguishable and noninteractive in the random oracle model.
Outline of the Paper
We introduce some notation and review the necessary background on lattices in Section 2. For the reader who is already familiar with lattices, we highlight the following aspects of our treatment that are new to this work:
• In Section 2.2 (cf. Lemma 2) and in the rest of the paper, we consider the LWE problem under a non-standard error distribution. Peikert [26] shows that the hardness of the LWE problem under this distribution is implied by standard hardness results.
• In Section 2.4 we describe a technique for sampling a basis for an orthogonal lattice and its associated trapdoor.
We turn to group signatures in Section 3. We review the standard definitions of security for group signature schemes in Section 3.1, describe our construction in Section 3.2, and prove anonymity and traceability in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
Preliminaries on Lattices
Throughout, we use n for the security parameter; other parameters are taken to be functions of n. When we say "statistically close" we mean "within statistical difference negligible in n." We review some basic properties of lattices as used in prior work. This section is included mainly to fix notation and ideas, and we refer to the original papers (cited below) for further exposition.
We use bold lower-case letters (e.g., x) to denote vectors, and bold upper-case letters (e.g., B) to denote matrices. (Our vectors are always column vectors.) We let ||x|| denote the Euclidean (i.e., 2 ) norm of the vector x, and let ||B|| denote the maximum of the Euclidean norms of the columns of B; i.e., if B = (b 1 | · · · |b n ) then ||B|| def = max i ||b i ||. If x ∈ R, then x denotes the rounding of x to the nearest integer.
For q an integer, Z q denotes the standard group of integers modulo q. We extend modular arithmetic to the reals in the obvious way: for example, for q ∈ Z + and x ∈ R we use x mod q to represent the unique real number y ∈ [0, q) such that x − y is an integer multiple of q. Finally, we define a notion of distance between elements in Z q in the natural way: given x, y ∈ Z q , their distance |x − y| is defined by mapping (x − y) mod q to the set of integers {− q/2 , . . . , q/2 − 1} and then taking the absolute value of the result. We define the distance between two vectors x and y in Z m q in an analogous way, namely, ||x
In other words, Λ(A T ) consists of all linear combinations of the columns of A T , shifted by integer multiples of the modulus q. We define 2 the orthogonal lattice Λ ⊥ (A) as
An observation worth noting is that for any y ∈ Λ(A T ) and w ∈ Λ ⊥ (A), it holds that y T w = 0 mod q. Finally, for a vector z ∈ Z m q we define
Gaussian Error Distributions
The one-dimensional (continuous) Gaussian distribution over R, parameterized by s ∈ R + , is defined by the density function
The m-dimensional continuous Gaussian distribution is defined in a similar way, by the density
. In this work we always let D s (resp., D s,c ) denote truncated Gaussian distributions, i.e., the Gaussian distribution conditioned on |x| < s · ω( √ log n) (resp., ||x − c|| < s · ω( √ log n)). The truncated and non-truncated distributions are statistically close, and we drop the word "truncated" from now on. 2 Our definition of an orthogonal lattice differs from that given in some previous work. Λ ⊥ (A), as we define it, is merely a scaling of (Λ(A T )) * , the dual of Λ(A T ). In particular, Λ
Let Λ ⊆ Z m be a lattice. The discrete Gaussian distribution D Λ,s,c is the m-dimensional Gaussian distribution centered at c, but with support restricted to the lattice Λ. (We write D Λ,s as shorthand for D Λ,s,0 .) Formally, the density function of the discrete Gaussian distribution is
.
Gentry et al. [19] show that given a basis B for Λ, this distribution can be sampled efficiently (to within negligible statistical distance) for s ≥ ||B|| · ω( √ log n).
The Learning with Errors Problem
The "learning with errors" (LWE) problem was introduced by Regev [28] as a generalization of the "learning parity with noise" problem. We describe the problem in a form suitable for our applications in this paper. Fix a positive integer n, integers m ≥ n and q ≥ 2, a vector s ∈ Z n q , and a probability distribution χ on R m . (For our purposes, χ will always be a product distribution in each coordinate.) Define the following two distributions over Z n×m
• LWE m,q,χ (s) is the distribution obtained by choosing uniform A ∈ Z n×m q , sampling e ← χ, and outputting (A, A T s + e mod q).
• U m,q is the distribution obtained by choosing uniform A ∈ Z n×m q and uniform y ∈ [0, q) m , and outputting (A, y).
The decisional variant of the LWE problem (relative to the distribution χ) can be stated informally as the problem of distinguishing between LWE m,q,χ (s) (for a uniform, unknown s) and U m,q . Formally, for m, q, and χ that may depend on n we say the LWE m,q,χ problem is hard if the following is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D:
A standard setting for the LWE problem considers the error distribution D αq . We write LWE m,q,α (s) as an abbreviation for LWE m,q,Dαq (s). Evidence for the hardness of the LWE m,q,α problem comes from a result of Regev [28] , who gave a quantum reduction from approximating certain lattice problems in the worst case to solving LWE m,q,α , subject to the condition that α·q > 2 √ n. Peikert [25] later gave a classical reduction with similar parameters. For our purposes, we note that the LWE m,q,α problem is believed to be hard (given the state-of-the-art in lattice algorithms) for any m, q = poly(n) and α = 1/poly(n) subject to α · q > 2 √ n. A second error distribution that can be considered for the LWE problem 3 -and the one that we will use in this paper -is the discrete Gaussian distribution D Z m ,αq . (We write LWE m,q,α as an abbreviation for LWE m,q,D Z m ,αq .) Although this distribution may seem similar to a discretized (rounded) version of D α (for appropriate choice of α ), these distributions are statistically far from each other and thus we cannot immediately conclude anything about the hardness of the LWE problem with respect to one distribution from hardness of the LWE problem with respect to 3 When using a discrete error distribution χ over Z m (rather than a continuous distribution over R m ), the LWE problem is to distinguish LWEm,q,χ from the uniform distribution over
the other. Fortunately, a recent result of Peikert [26] can be used to show that hardness of the LWE m,q,α √ 2 problem is implied by hardness of the LWE m,q,α problem. The following is a special case of Peikert's result [26, Theorem 1] (for the standard definition of η (Λ), the smoothing parameter of the lattice Λ, see [26] Below, we take Λ = Z m for which η (Z m ) = O( log −1 ) (see [23, Lemma 3.3] ). When s 1 = Ω( √ log n), as will be the case for our applications, we can then take to be negligible and thus the two distributions considered in the lemma are statistically close. With this in place we can now prove our desired result:
Proof We show an efficient transformation T that takes as input (A, y) ∈ Z n×m q × [0, q) m and has the following properties:
•
The lemma follows immediately from these two properties. The transformation T works as follows. Given (A, y), it samples a vector w ← D Z m −y,αq and outputs (A, y + w mod q).
Say (A, y) is distributed uniformly over Z n×m q × [0, q) m . Note that y + w is always an integer vector, and the distribution D Z m −y,αq depends only on the fractional part of each entry of y. In other words, the integer part of each entry in y ensures that each entry of y + w mod q is uniform in Z q . It follows that (A, y + w mod q) is distributed uniformly over Z n×m q × Z m q . On the other hand, say y = A T s+e mod q where e ← D αq . Since we have A T s ∈ Z m , sampling w ← D Z m −y,αq is equivalent to sampling w ← D Z m −e,αq . Using Lemma 1, sampling e ← D αq and then setting e = e + w for w ← D Z m −e,αq yields a distribution for e that is statistically close to sampling e ← D Z m ,αq √ 2 . We conclude that the output T (A, y) = A, A T s + (e + w) mod q has distribution statistically close to that of LWE m,q,α √ 2 (s).
Trapdoor Functions and the GPV Signature Scheme
Ajtai [2] and Alwen and Peikert [3] show algorithms that generate an almost uniform matrix A ∈ Z n×m q together with a "trapdoor" matrix T ∈ Z m×m satisfying the following conditions:
There is a ppt algorithm TrapSamp that, on input 1 n , 1 m , q with q ≥ 2 and m ≥ 8n log q, outputs matrices A ∈ Z n×m q and T ∈ Z m×m such that the distribution on A is statistically close to uniform over Z n×m q and, with probability all but negligible in n:
• the columns of T form a basis of the lattice Λ ⊥ (A), implying in particular A·T = 0 (mod q),
• T = O(n log q) and T = O( √ n log q). (Here, T is the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of T.)
Given an "LWE instance" (A, y = A T s + e mod q) for a "short" vector e, knowledge of T can be used to recover s. Specifically, if ||T|| < L and e is drawn from D αq for α ≤ 1/(L · ω( √ log n)), then s can be easily recovered. This is done by first computing
Since T and e contain only "small" entries, each entry of the vector T T e is smaller than q and thus T T e mod q is equal to T T e (over the integers). Multiplying by (T T ) −1 thus gives e, after which it is easy to recover s. Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [19] show how to use the trapdoor sampling procedure described above to construct a one-way preimage-sampleable function. This can then be turned into a digital signature scheme using an "FDH-like" construction [8] . (See [19] for a formal definition of preimage-sampleable functions and the construction of the signature scheme.) Here, we describe how the preimage-sampleable function works.
Take q = poly(n), m ≥ 8n log q, and s = ω( √ n log q log n). The one-way preimage-sampleable function is defined by the following algorithms:
• GPVGen(1 n ) runs TrapSamp(1 n , 1 m , q) to obtain (A, T). The matrix A (and q) defines the function f A (e) = Ae mod q, with domain {e ∈ Z m : ||e|| ≤ s √ m} and range Z n q . Hardness of inversion is with respect to the distribution D Z m ,s over the domain.
• The trapdoor inversion algorithm GPVInvert(A, T, s, u) samples from f −1 A (u) as follows: first, it computes (using standard linear algebra) t ∈ Z m such that At = u (mod q). (Except for a negligible fraction of A, such a t always exists.) Then it samples and outputs e ← D Λ ⊥ (A)+t,s .
The above is one-way if GapSVP is worst-case hard for some suitable approximation factor [1] .
Sampling a Random Superlattice with a Short Basis
We show a variant of the trapdoor sampling algorithm described in Lemma 3. In our variant, the algorithm is additionally given a matrix B ∈ Z n×m q whose columns span Z n q , and should output a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q (with an associated trapdoor T ∈ Z m×m ) satisfying the additional requirement that Λ(B T ) ⊆ Λ ⊥ (A). Thus, A is sampled under the condition that Λ ⊥ (A) is a superlattice of Λ(B T ) or, equivalently, AB T = 0 (mod q). We also require that the trapdoor T be a "random basis" for Λ ⊥ (A), in the sense that the columns of T are distributed according to a discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ ⊥ (A).
Overview of the construction. Say we are given a matrix B whose columns span Z n q . Write
with B 2 a square, invertible matrix of dimension n × n. (By the stated assumption on B, such a decomposition can always be found, permuting the rows of B T if necessary.) We generate a matrix A = [A 1 | A 2 ] in two steps. We generate the first component A 1 using the TrapSamp protocol. Recall, this returns a matrix that is statistically close to uniform, along with an associated trapdoor T 1 . With A 1 fixed, the second component A 2 is constrained to a fixed value by the requirement that AB T = 0 (mod q); we generate A 2 by solving the linear equations that define this constraint.
We then need to extend T 1 into a trapdoor T whose columns are "short" and such that A·T = 0. Here we rely on a recent techniques of Cash et al. [15] , which allows us to extend T 1 into a basis T for Λ ⊥ (A). We use a second technique from their work to "randomize" T before outputting it.
Lemma 4 There is a ppt algorithm SuperSamp that on input 1 n , 1 m , q, and B ∈ Z n×m q , where q ≥ 2, m ≥ n + 8n log q, and the columns of B ∈ Z n×m q span Z n q , outputs A ∈ Z n×m q and T ∈ Z m×m such that AB T = 0 (mod q) and the distribution on A is statistically close to uniform over Z n×m q subject to this condition. Moreover, with probability all but negligible in n:
Proof Let m 2 = n and m 1 = m − m 2 . Write
where B 1 ∈ Z m 1 ×n q and B 2 ∈ Z m 2 ×n q , and furthermore the (square) matrix B 2 has full rank over Z q . (By the stated assumption on B, such a decomposition can always be found, permuting the rows of B T if necessary.)
Algorithm SuperSamp works as follows:
If the columns of A 1 do not span Z n q , output ⊥. (This occurs only with negligible probability.) Otherwise, let A 2 ∈ Z n×m 2 q be the unique matrix satisfying
Since B 2 is invertible, A 2 can be computed as
for Λ ⊥ (A) using the ExtBasis algorithm of Cash et al. [15] .
3. Randomize T into a "random basis" T by applying the RandBasis algorithm of Cash et al. [15] to T , using s = || T || · log n. Output A and T.
We now verify that this algorithm satisfies the required properties. First observe that
The claim regarding the distribution of A follows directly from the construction and the fact that = O( n log q · √ m log n) (by properties of TrapSamp),
where the final equality holds with all but negligible probability. The lemma follows.
We will also use the following result regarding our algorithm SuperSamp: Proof In the first distribution, A is uniform and B is statistically close to uniform subject to the constraint BA T = 0 (mod q); in the second distribution, B is statistically close to uniform and A is statistically close to uniform subject to the constraint AB T = 0 (mod q). Thus, the marginal distributions of (A, B) are statistically close.
The lemma follows because, in both distributions, S is the result of applying the RandBasis algorithm to a basis for Λ ⊥ (B).
Efficient NIWI Proofs for Lattice Problems
Let B 1 , . . . , B N ∈ Z n×m q and z 1 , . . . , z N ∈ Z m q , and fix some γ = γ(n). In this section we briefly describe how it is possible to construct a noninteractive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) proof (in the random oracle model) for the gap language
Here, L Y ES is a collection of N points at least one of which is close to the corresponding lattice, and L N O is a collection of N points all of which are far from the corresponding lattices. Consider the gap version of the closest vector problem, i.e., the language
It is known [20, 24] that there is an (interactive) witness-indistinguishable (WI) proof system for L γ when γ = Ω( m/ log m). Observe that L s,γ can be described as the disjunction of several instance of L γ ; that is,
We can thus use the techniques of Cramer, Damgård, and Schoenmakers [17] to obtain an interactive WI proof for L s,γ with negligible soundness error. Using the Fiat-Shamir transformation [18] , the resulting protocol can be made non-interactive in the random oracle model. These observations are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Let γ = Ω( m/ log m). There is an NIWI proof system for L s,γ in the random oracle model, where the length of the proof is O(mnN log q) bits.
We remark that for our application we only require soundness (and do not require the proof system to be a proof of knowledge) and witness indistinguishability (rather than zero knowledge).
A Group Signature Scheme Based on Lattices

Definitions
We adopt the definition of group signature schemes from the work of Bellare, Micciancio, and Warinschi [7] , with the relaxation suggested by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [10] (and considered also in, e.g., [11] ). Formally, a group signature scheme GS = (G.KeyGen, G.Sign, G.Vrfy, G.Open) is a collection of four polynomial-time algorithms defined as follows.
• The group key-generation algorithm G.KeyGen(1 n , 1 N ) is a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter 1 n and the group size 1 N as input, and outputs (PK, TK, gsk), where PK is the group public key, TK is the group manager's tracing key, and gsk is a vector of N signing keys with gsk[i] being the signing key given to the i th group member.
• The group signature algorithm G.Sign(gsk[i], M ) is a randomized algorithm that takes as input a secret signing key gsk[i] and a message M , and outputs a signature σ.
• The group signature verification algorithm G.Vrfy(PK, M, σ) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the group public key PK, a message M , and a signature σ, and outputs either 1 or 0 (signifying accept or reject, respectively).
• The opening algorithm G.Open(TK, M, σ) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the tracing key TK, a message M , and a signature σ, and outputs an identity i ∈ [N ].
The basic consistency requirements of a group signature scheme are that an honest signature generated by a group member should be accepted as correct, and must be traceable to the group member who issued it. That is, for any (PK, TK, gsk) output by G. KeyGen(1 n , 1 N ) , any M , and
G.Vrfy(PK, M, σ) = 1 and G.Open(TK, M, σ) = i, except with negligible probability over the entire experiment.
Group signature schemes are also required to satisfy two basic security properties: anonymity and traceability. Anonymity means that without the tracing key it should be infeasible to determine which group member issued a particular signature (even given all the signing keys). Bellare et al. [7] defined a "CCA-version" of this notion, where the adversary is given access to a tracing oracle. Following [10] we use a "CPA-version" of anonymity where such oracle access is not given.
Definition 1 A group signature scheme GS = (G.KeyGen, G.Sign, G.Vrfy, G.Open) is anonymous if for all polynomials N (·) and all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, the advantage of A in the following experiment is negligible in n:
1. Compute (PK, TK, gsk) ← G.KeyGen(1 n , 1 N ) and give (PK, gsk) to A. Traceability means that it should be infeasible for an adversary who corrupts some set of users C to output a valid signature that cannot be traced to some member of C.
A outputs distinct identities
Definition 2 A group signature scheme GS = (G.KeyGen, G.Sign, G.Vrfy, G.Open) is traceable if for all polynomials N (·) and all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, the success probability of A in the following experiment is negligible in n:
1. Compute (PK, TK, gsk) ← G.KeyGen(1 n , 1 N ) and give (PK, TK) to A.
2.
A may query the following oracles adaptively and in any order:
• A Sign oracle that on input i, M outputs G.Sign(gsk[i], M ).
3. At some point, A outputs a message M and a signature σ.
Let C be the set of identities queried to Corrupt. A succeeds if (1) G.Vrfy(PK, M, σ) = 1 and (2) Sign(i, M ) was never queried for i ∈ C, yet (3) G.Open(TK, M, σ) ∈ C.
Our Construction
Let q = poly(n), m ≥ 8n log q, s = ω( √ n log q log n), and γ = Ω( m/ log m) be parameters of the system. We let H : {0, 1} * → Z n q be a hash function, to be modeled as a random oracle. The group signature scheme is defined as follows:
as the public key, TK = (S i ) N i=1 as the tracing key, and gsk = (T i ) N i=1 as the signing keys.
To sign message M using secret key gsk[j] = T j , choose random r ← {0, 1} n , and compute h i = H(M r i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Then:
• Compute e j ← GPVInvert(A j , T j , s, h j ).
• For i = j, choose e i ∈ Z m q uniformly subject to the condition that A i e i = h i (mod q).
For all i, sample s i ← Z n q and compute z i = B T i s i + e i mod q ∈ Z m q . Finally, construct an NIWI proof π for the gap language L s,γ as discussed in Section 2.5 (and using the witness (s i , i)). Output the signature (r, z 1 , . . . , z N , π) .
G.Vrfy(PK, M, σ): Parse the signature as (r, z 1 , . . . , z N , π). Output 1 iff the proof π is correct, and
G.Open(TK, M, σ): Parse the signature as (r, z 1 , . . . , z N , π). Using the {S i }, output the smallest index i for which 4 
We first check correctness. Let (r, z 1 , . . . , z N , π) be a signature produced by an honest signer. It is clear that π is a valid proof. Moreover, for any i we have
and so verification succeeds. Correctness of the opening algorithm follows easily.
Theorem 1 Let m, q, and s be as described above. If the LWE m,q,α problem is hard for α = s/(q √ 2), then the group signature scheme described above is anonymous. If the GapSVP γ problem is hard for γ = O(n log 4 n), then the group signature scheme described above is traceable.
We note that for values of s as described above, the hardness of LWE m,q,α is implied [28] by the quantum hardness of approximating GapSVPγ forγ = O(n/α). Thus, our entire scheme can be based on quantum hardness of GapSVP.
We prove anonymity in Section 3.3 and traceability in Section 3.4.
Anonymity
Fix N = poly(n) and let A be a ppt adversary attacking the group signature scheme in the sense of Definition 1. Let G 0 denote the experiment of Definition 1 with b = 0, and let G 1 be the same experiment with b = 1. We consider a sequence of experiments G 0 , G 0 , G 1 , G 1 and show that each experiment is indistinguishable from the one preceding it. This implies anonymity. We review G 0 as applied to our group signature scheme. First, the key-generation algorithm G.KeyGen(1 n , 1 N ) is run and A is given the public key PK = (A i , B i ) N i=1 and the secret keys gsk = (T i ) N i=1 , where each B i is statistically close to uniform and (A i , T i ) ← SuperSamp(1 n , 1 m , q, B i ). (The tracing key TK is irrelevant in the CPA-version of the anonymity experiment that we are considering.) Next, A outputs i 0 , i 1 , M , and is given a signature of user i 0 on M , computed in the following way. Let h i = H(M r i), for a random r ∈ {0, 1} n . Then e i 0 is computed as e i 0 ← GPVInvert(A i 0 , T i 0 , s, h i 0 ), whereas e i (for i = i 0 ) is chosen uniformly subject to the condition that A i e i = h i (mod q). Then, for all i ∈ [N ], choose random s i ← Z n q and compute z i = B T i s i + e i . Finally, a proof π is generated and A is given the signature (r, z 1 , . . . , z N , π). In G 0 we introduce the following modification with respect to G 0 : when generating the signature, we now compute Let D rand denote the above experiment when D's input y is uniformly distributed. We claim that A's view in D rand is statistically close to its view in G 0 . Indeed, the only differences are:
• In G 0 we have h i 1 chosen uniformly in Z n q ; then e i 1 ∈ Z m q is chosen uniformly subject to A i 1 e i 1 = h i 1 (mod q); and finally z i 1 = B T i 1 s i 1 + e i 1 mod q.
• In D rand we can write z i 1 = y = B T i 1 s i 1 + e i 1 mod q for e i 1 chosen uniformly in Z m q ; then
Thus, it suffices to show that the distribution on (h, e) defined by choosing uniform h ∈ Z n q and then choosing e ∈ Z m q uniformly subject to A i 1 e = h (mod q) is statistically close to the distribution on (h, e) defined by choosing e uniformly and the setting h = A i 1 e. Define a function f : Z m q → Z n q via f (e) = A i 1 e, and note that f is regular. Assuming the columns of A i 1 span Z n q (this occurs with all but negligible probability), the co-domain of f is Z n q and hence f applied to a uniform input yields a uniform element of Z n q . The stated claim follows. On the other hand, let D LWE denote the above experiment when D's input y is distributed according to y = B T s + e for e ← D Z m ,s . We claim that A's view in D LW E is statistically close to its view in G 0 . Indeed:
• In experiment G 0 we have h i 1 chosen uniformly in Z n q . Then, the value e i 1 is computed as e i 1 ← GPVInvert(A i 1 , T i 1 , s, h i 1 ), and finally z i 1 = B T i 1 s i 1 + e i 1 mod q.
• In D LW E we have z i 1 = y = B T i 1
5 Note that, except with negligible probability, H(M r i1) has not been queried thus far.
Statistical closeness follows using the results of [19] . Since the probability that D does not abort is 2/N , and its decision to abort is independent of A's success, this completes the proof.
The rest of the proof of anonymity is straightforward, and so we merely provide a sketch. Experiment G 1 is identical to G 0 with the exception that the proof π is now computed using the witness (s i 1 , i 1 ) rather than (s i 0 , i 0 ). Witness indistinguishability of the proof system implies that G 1 and G 0 are computationally indistinguishable.
Computational indistinguishability of G 1 and G 1 (the experiment from Definition 1 with b = 1) can be proved exactly as in the proof of the previous claim.
Traceability
Fix N = poly(n) and let A be a ppt adversary attacking the group signature scheme in the sense of Definition 2. We construct a ppt forger F for the GPV signature scheme [19] (in the random oracle model) whose success probability is polynomially related to that of A. Since the GPV signature scheme is secure assuming hardness of the GapSVP γ problem, this completes the proof.
We first observe that we may, without loss of generality, assume that A never corrupts all users in [N ] because A can succeed with only negligible probability in this case. (Given a valid signature (r, z 1 , . . . , z N , π), soundness of the proof system implies that G.Open outputs some i ∈ [N ] except with negligible probability.)
F is given a public key A for the GPV signature scheme, and begins by choosing a random index i * ∈ [N ] and setting A i * = A. Next, it computes (B i * , S i * ) ← SuperSamp(1 n , 1 m , q, A i * ). For the remaining indices i = i * , the forger computes (B i , S i ) ← TrapSamp(1 n , 1 m , q) and then (A i , T i ) ← SuperSamp(1 n , 1 m , q, B i ) and S i ← RandBasis(S i ) exactly as in the real key-generation algorithm. F gives PK = (A i , B i ) N i=1 and TK = (S i ) N i=1 to A. By Lemma 5, the distribution of these values (in particular, (A i * , B i * , S i * )) is statistically close to the distribution that is expected by the adversary.
F answers random oracle queries of A by simply passing these queries to its own random oracle. F responds to the other queries of A as follows:
• Corrupt(i): if i = i * then F gives T i to A, while if i = i * then F aborts.
• Sign(i, M ): If i = i * then F computes the signature using T i and the honest signing algorithm.
If i = i * , then:
1. F chooses random r ∈ {0, 1} n and queries its own signing oracle on the message M r i * . It receives in return a signature e i * .
2. The remainder of the signature is computed using the honest signing algorithm. (Note that computation of e i * the only aspect of signing that relies on the secret key of user i * .)
Let C denote the set of identities that A has queried to Corrupt. (Recall that if F has not aborted, then i * ∈ C.) At some point A outputs a message M and signature σ = (r, z 1 , . . . , z N , π) . Assume G.Vrfy(PK, M, σ) = 1, and that Sign(i, M ) was never queried for i ∈ C. Since F knows TK, it can compute j ← G.Open(TK, M, σ). If j = i * then F aborts. Otherwise, F uses S i * to recover e i * such that
• ||e i * || ≤ s √ m, and
• z i * − e i * ∈ Λ(B T i * ).
It then outputs the forgery (M r i * , e i * ). Let be the probability with which A succeeds in the experiment of Definition 2. It is easy to see that F aborts with probability at most (N − 1)/N + negl(n) (where the negligible term arises from the possibility that A violates soundness of the proof system) and, conditioned on not aborting, the view of A when run as a sub-routine by F is statistically close to its view in the experiment of Definition 2. Thus, with probability at least /N − negl(n) it holds that A outputs (M, σ) with G.Vrfy(PK, M, σ) = 1 and G.Open(TK, M, σ) = i * , and where A never queried Sign(i * , M ). We show that whenever this occurs, F outputs a valid forgery (except with negligible probability).
Fix (M, σ) so the above hold, and let σ = (r, z 1 , . . . , z N , π). Since G.Open(TK, M, σ) = i * , this implies that F will be able to recover e i * such that (1) ||e i * || ≤ s √ m and (2) z i * − e i * ∈ Λ(B T i * ). Moreover, since G.Vrfy(PK, M, σ) = 1 we have A i * z i * = H(M r i * ); since A i * (z i * − e i * ) = 0 this means A i * e i * = H(M r i * ). Thus e i * is a valid GPV signature on the message M r i * . Since A never queried Sign(i * , M ), we know that F never queried its own signing oracle for a signature on M r i * . It follows that the output of F is indeed a valid forgery.
